This article is according to the characteristics of the industrial development in Fujian province. First, we set an evolution game model. Second, we use the mechanism that industrial innovation promotes structural optimization of industry to analyze how industrial innovation promotes industrial structural optimization. Then we combine the model deduced before with the realistic development situation of the industry to test and verify. We thereby obtain some attributes and characteristics of the industrial development in Fujian province, and then we will also analyze and explain about these attributes and characteristics. On the base of the analysis and explain before, we finally come up with policy suggestions about industrial innovation for industrial structural optimization.
Introduction
Since reform and opening up, economic gro wth has continued over 30 years, and the economic construction of Fujian province has made great achievements. During mo re than twenty years, the economy in Fu jian keeps growing as fast as 10% over a long period. But the worries are hidden behind the great achievements. Resources tend to be exhausted because of long-term immoderate exp loitat ion, and industrial division is lying in the low end of international division for a long time. A ll these problems are related to the extensive economic growth pattern that our country relies on energy, minerals and labor resources, and the key to solve these problem is industrial innovation..
The basic theory and basic model

The effect analysis model of innovative policy for industrial innovation: evolution game theory 2.1.1. Evolution game in replicator dynamic mechanism
Investigate an evolution game. The nu mber o f pure strategies every game r can choose is i (i=1,2,…,n). The game is repeated during a period of t (t =1, 2…). Set i t P as the proportion of the gamers using strategy i S . The payoff of strategy i S is i t = i ( t P ). We label the strategies so as to make
Set t ij P as the probability of those gamers who first adopted i S and then turn to j S . t ij P are decided by the following formula:
Here, is a number wh ich is small enough to make ij P 1 for all i, j. The expected value of the probability that gamers adopt i S in the period of t+dt is shown as
Here, t _ = t t P 1 1 +…+ t n t n P represents the average payoff of the whole group. Minus i t P fro m both sides of the equation, then divided by dt. When dt approaches 0, we get the following formula:
We call formula (1) replicator dynamic equation, and we may suppose =1.
The evolution game model of industrial innovation in replicat or dynamic mechanism
2.1.2.1. The hypothesis of the model The enterprise's scales are all the same. The group is very large in scale, that is to say, the number of the gamers approaches infinity. Every gamer can only use pure strategy: innovative strategy or conservative strategy. The payoff of innovative strategy is greater than conservative strategy. Supposing that an industry consists of n enterprises (n approaches infinity). Pairwise enterprises repeat confrontations in random matching. Each enterprise can use innovative strategy 1 S or conservative strategy 2 S . It's shown as Fig.1 . If the two enterprises both use conservative strategy, they divide the payoff of 2v (v > 0) equally. If they both use innovative strategy, they divide the payoff of 2u (2u >2v > 0) equally, also, they had to bear the cost of innovative working: c. If one uses innovative strategy while the other uses conservative strategy, the one using innovative strategy gain s 2u-c+ c 0 while the other gains v.
Fig. 1. Matrix representation of random matching game on industrial innovation
We presume 12 t P as the probability of those gamers who first adopted 1 S and than turn to 2 S . Supposing that the proportion of those enterprises who take strategy 1 S among all the enterprises is x. Because n approaches infin ity, x may be regarded as a continuous variable. According to the replicator dynamic equation (1), we get:
.2. The equilibrium analysis of the model
The equilibriu m point of the evolution game model und er replicator dynamic mechanism is in the place where f (x) = 0. Solve the equation, and we get x=0, 1, (2u-c-v)/u.
According to replicator dynamic linear theory we see that it will be stabilized when f ' (x * ) <0, on the contrary, when f ' (x * )>0, it won't be stabilized. As we can't judge the stability when f ' (x * ) =0, we discuss it by using the character of f(x) and then we will get Table 1 shown below.
T able 1. T he evolution equilibrium of industrial innovation replicator evolution system 
The empirical analysis of industrial innovation and industrial structure in Fujian province
The analyze of the effect on industrial innovation by the government 's supply policy
Presume an industry is constituted by n enterprises (n approaches infinity). In this industry, supposing that the government reduces innovative cost c 0 by supply policy. Pairwise enterprises repeat confrontations in random matching. Each enterprise can use innovative management S 1 or conservative management S 2 . By analyzing we get Fig.3 shown below: So we come to this system's replicator dynamic equation:
There are three anchors: x=0, 1, (2u-c+c 0 -v)/u. Through the analysis, we work out the industrial innovation's evolution equilibrium shown as Table 2: T able 2 Industrial innovation's evolution equilibrium
By analy zing Table 1 , we can find that if we want to make the innovation succeed ed, we need to make 2u-c-v>0. So (c+v)/2 can be regarded as a critical value. If the innovative payoff is lo wer than the crit ical value, the industrial innovation will be a failure; otherwise the industrial innovation will succeed. After the government takes the supply policy into effect, the cost will reduce to c-c 0 . At this time, the crit ical value also correspondingly decrease to (c-c 0 +v)/2. So me innovative payoff may be lower than the crit ical value (c+v)/ 2 before the government intervention and then may be higher than (c-c 0 +v)/2 after government intervention. In popular words, the govern ment supply policy reduces the "threshold" of industrial innovative success. So it has an effect on encouraging innovative strategy adopted throughout the industry. In other words, it encourages industrial innovation.
The analysis of industrial innovation for industrial structural optimization
We will analyze the embodiment of industrial innovation during industrial transformat ion of Fujian province from four aspects.
Industrial innovation is the foundation of traditional industries' transformation and upgrade and new industries' formation.
On one hand, the traditional industries are great advantages of Fujian, and the key to keeping the advantages is to use high and new technology to transform and upgrade the competit iveness of traditional industries. On the other hand, industrial innovation is the main factor o f accelerating the format ion of new industries. Innovation will lead a certain industrial market demand beco me saturated and industrial development may stagnate. Also, innovation can prompt new industries' formation by technology-driven and demand towing.
Technological innovation is the key to enhancing the industrial core competitive power and transform the industrial current development model
Relying on technological innovation is the key to cultivating the enterprise's core competitive power, and changing the current extensive and high cost industrial development pattern, reducing the adverse effect of high dependence on foreign trade and foreign technology on economic development. If an industry wants to keep developing, scientific and technological innovation is necessary.
Industrial innovation is a requirement of extending the industrial lifecycle
In Fu jian p rovince, many industries are faced with the phenomenon of short industrial lifecycle. For the industries consisted of enterprise groups, Technology in different stages of industrial lifecycle affects the industrial develop ment through working on the relevant factors among different enterprise groups. The improvement of the products' performance and the reduction of the cost caused by technological innovation will expand production demand, so as to extend the product s' golden cycle.
Technological innovation is the core of industrial structural optimization
Technological innovation adjusts the industrial structure through affecting demand structure and supply structure. A new technology can make the production cost reduced and the demand increased, and it can also make consumer goods and consumer demand structure upgraded. The direct result of technological innovation is the imp rovement of social labour productivity. This will pro mote industrial division to deepen and new industries to appear, and the industrial structure will constantly optimize and upgrade.
Further explanation of the conclusion
The analysis above shows that the competition between enterprises can not always make innovation a success in the entire industry. Therefore, govern ment's appropriate intervention is necessary. For a successful intervention of the government, the following several tasks remains to be done:
The subject localization of industrial innovation for Fujian industrial optimization.
The system arrangement of industrial innovation for Fujian industrial optimization. Adopt market-oriented operation pattern and structure the industrial innovative system which consist of officer, production, study and research.
